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INTRODUCTION
RALPH NADER*
At this date a study of the weaknesses of property tax adminis-
tration must be greeted with a certain sense of deja-vu. The
property tax must rank among the most studied and lamented of
American institutions, and among the least reformed. As the
present articles point out, by 1916 the Kentucky property tax had
been studied by no fewer than four different commissions. The
abuses catalogued, and the remedies by that time prescribed,
were essentially those advanced so cogently here over fifty years
later. In state after state the story is the same. Eloquent,
thoroughly-documented calls for reform lie buried away in the
official archives.
When the abuses and their remedies are so well known, why
has nothing been done? The urgency of need is not lacking.
Where property tax administration most needs reform, it seems
public revenues are in the worst condition. Regrettably, Ken-
tucky itself provides an example. In eastern Kentucky, as Harry
Caudill and others have so persuasively shown, local governments
and school districts stand starved and threadbare astride some
of the most mineral-rich land in the world. But corporations,
some of the nation's most profitable, cart this wealth away,
leaving not tax dollars but only rubble and ravaged, worthless
land behind.
The revenue potential is there. Effective administration of
existing property tax laws could get at much of it. Why has the
property tax been allowed to remain so weak for so long?
Powerful private interests benefit from weak local property
tax administration. While not the whole story, that is a good
portion of it. Where administration is weak, where local officials
lack power or competence or will or all three, large private con-
cerns can be a tax law unto themselves. So it has been in Ken-
tucky. Mr. Richard Kirby reported in the October, 1969 Appa-
lachian Lookout that coal companies in eastern Kentucky literally
present their own assessment to the county tax commissioner.
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They tell him how much land they own (in aggregate amounts
only) and how much it is worth. "People (meaning 'coal com-
panies') just paid what they thought they should. Still do, mostly'
one tax commissioner said. Even if a commissioner wants to
check the figures, he lacks the means. And should he be so
presumptuous as to challenge the self-assessment anyway, the
company promptly appeals to the county board of tax super-
visors. The chairman of that board is typically an official of the
county's largest coal company, according to Mr. Kirby.
The coal companies which write their own assessments have
not been unduly harsh on themselves. The Louisville Courier-
Journal said in 1965:
Coal has been a reluctant taxpayer ... The industry has been
able to get rock-bottom assessments on land loaded with black
wealth. Thousands of acres of coal land worth $200 to $300
an acre get on the assessment books at $2.00 an acre. Other
thousands of acres are literally hidden from the assessor.
In coal-rich Pike County, where 45.3% of the people live below
the poverty level and where the school district could raise only
18.3% (rather high for eastern Kentucky) of its costs, 40% to
60% of the county's land and wealth were found to be under-
assessed or not assessed at all. Over 65 million dollars worth of
coal was mined out of this revenue-starved county in 1966.
As minimal as the public services have been in eastern Ken-
tucky, someone has had to pay for them. Who? The small local
property owners have been paying more than their share-
subsidizing, in effect, their corporate malefactors. Mr. Caudill,
in Night Comes to the Cumberlands, cites examples of land be-
longing to individuals being assessed at four times the rate of land
belonging to the coal companies, and of the homes of company
officials being assessed at a fraction of the value put on the plainer
homes of working people. Then too, taxpayers in the rest of the
state pick up much of the remaining tab. And even here, on the
state level, it is individual and not corporate taxpayers who carry
the load. Data presented at the recent National Education As-
sociation hearings in Kentucky revealed that, measured against
fifty-state averages, Kentucky has over-utilized the general sales
and individual income taxes, while it has under-utilized corporate
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income, general property, and severance taxes.1 The sales tax is
illustrative. Kentucky's sales tax rate is the second highest in the
country, but machinery for new or expanded industry, including
most mining equipment, is exempted.
The people of Kentucky are not alone in being victimized by
large corporate interests. Riding roughshod over weak local
property-tax administrators, and striving to keep them that way,
appears to be a national corporate pastime. For example, a study
published in the December 4, 1970 Congressional Record showed
that oil and gas properties in Ector County, Texas, are being
undervalued by over 55%, and that in east Texas, six counties
and eight local school districts are losing over three-quarters of a
million dollars annually through the underassessment of timber-
lands. Atlantic Richfield, Shell Oil, Cities Service, Owens-Illinois,
and Champion-U.S. Plywood are among the needy beneficiaries
of this assessment largesse.
Nor are small rural taxing districts alone in their inability to
hold America's largest legal persons to the property tax laws. In
Gary, Indiana, U.S. Steel openly defies a city ordinance and
refuses to take out building permits when it makes additions to
its plant. Thus it denies the city assessor any information on its
property's value. The end result is the same as in the hills of
eastern Kentucky-virtual self-assessment. And as in Kentucky,
these self-assessments have not been unduly burdensome. Over the
last decade U.S. Steel has put as much as 1.2 billion dollars worth
of improvements into its Gary works, yet its property-tax assess-
ment during that time has risen by only about $10 million. While
property taxes on individual Gary residents have tripled, U.S.
SteeYs have gone up less than one-third.
In fact, U.S. Steel has left its mark on Kentucky as well as
on Gary. In 1969 it consumed about two-fifths of all the coal used
in steel manufacture in the United States, and it mined about
one-fifth itself. It mines more coal out of Harlan County, Ken-
tucky, than does any other extractor-International Harvestor is
number two-and it operates a preparation plant in Corbin.
The corporate presence of U.S. Steel in Gary (pop. 174,132)
iNational Education Association, Commission on Professional Eights and
Responsibilities, Education in Kentucky: A Legacy of Unkept Promise (May,
1971), p. 91.
1971]
KFNTucy LAw JouAL[o
and Harlan County (pop. 36,595), has been remarkably similar
and malign. Both localities are strapped for school funds. Gary's
fund for education, financed largely by property taxes, was nine
million dollars short this year. Harlan County could pay for
only 6.8 percent of its school costs in 1968. In Gary, Steel has not
been as retentive with its pollutants as it has with its tax dollars.
It and its subsidiary Universal Atlas Cement provide over four
pounds of harmful emissions daily for every Gary resident. And
Steel has been just as obliging in wrecking the Harlan County
environment. According to Harry Caudill, it is strip mining the
Big Black Mountain there-Kentucky's highest-on several levels.
"One of its seams is eleven feet thick and occasionally the cut
leaves ighwalls ninety feet high," he writes.
How do companies like U.S. Steel contrive to keep local tax
administration feeble and the communities in which they operate
tax-poor? Influence in the state legislatures is widespread; there
is an urgent need, in fact, to begin to monitor the actions of
corporate lobbyists. On the local level, corporate money and
influence have an arsenal of ways of working their will, from
offers of jobs or emoluments to local officials or their relatives, to
threats of reprisals against employees who "make trouble". In
Kentucky, of course, many of the coal companies literally got in
on the ground floor-they incorporated their company mining
towns and thus had control of local politics from the start.
"Tax blackmail" is the ultimate tactic for keeping legislators
and local officials in tow, and property tax administration weak.
But compliant local officials have been too ready to accept on
faith the corporate bleatings about tax burdens, and the threats
to move elsewhere. Where officials and citizen groups have
tested such assertions, they often have found them wanting. For
example, taconite producers in Minnesota were guaranteed favor-
able tax treatment for twenty-five years in a 1964 referendum.
Currently, taconite is taxed at only thirteen cents per ton, and the
producers-among whom is our old friend U.S. Steel-avow that
they need special treatment in order to survive in the world
market. Commissioned to test these avowals, the Stanford Re-
search Institute found that taxes on taconite actually could be
increased to fifty cents per ton without affecting the level of
taconite production in the state. Even larger increases, though
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possibly affecting yearly production, could result in still greater
revenue gains.2 It was said that, overall, Minnesota could be
receiving over $40,000,000 yearly in additional revenues from
taconite producers; and that if this revenue were applied to
matching-funds programs, the figure could grow to $200,000,000
or more. One must wonder what such a study would reveal
about the ability of Kentucky coal producers to absorb higher
taxes.
The demand for a "tax incentive" is a special side of corporate
tax blackmail. A handbook for business tax-dodgers advises on
how to exploit the local boosters:
It is often more advantageous to work with local groups,
especially those with close connections to the local govern-
ment-official or unofficial-than to work through State agen-
cies. Local groups may be in a better position to arrange for
such local matters as extending water and sewer lines to, and
improving roads near, your site. Too, they may be able to
obtain a "better break" for you on your property assessment.
3
Far from applying residency requirements to corporate welfare
applicants, localities have fallen over themselves to coax them in.
The eagerness to attract new "industry", and the anxiety over
losing old, is premised on two notions: first, that such industry
is a boon to the locality even if it does not pay its share of taxes,
and second that property tax levels are an important determinant
of industrial location. Both of these notions have been accepted
too often on faith, and both are questionable.
For the first, it is not completely clear that anyone actually
benefits from local tax subsidies to corporations besides the
corporation itself and a few special interests. Here in Kentucky,
the United States Department of Agriculture examined the impact
of new industry on five small towns. Some of the industries had
been offered "incentives", ranging from "favorable" property tax
assessments (at about one percent of market value) to free
extensions of water lines. The USDA found that "The establish-
ment of new manufacturing plants in five rural towns in Ken-
2 William V. Morris, The Effect of Higher Production Taxes on the Min-
nesota Taconite Industry, (SRI Project ECC-8298, Stanford Research Institute,
Menlo Park, California, May, 1970).
3 Prentice-Hall Inc., The Prentice-Hall Guide to State Industrial Development
Incentives, (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), p. 10.
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tucky during the period 1958-1963 had a negative net fiscal impact
on most of the affected local government units". 4 The impact
was negative (albeit small, in most cases), the Department found,
even when no special tax treatment was extended. Moreover,
the study was limited to fiscal impacts. The costs arising to the
communities from pollution, congestion, and the other ill effects
of industry were not considered.
The importance of tax rates in plant location decisions is
likewise in doubt. After extensive study, the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded in 1967, "Be-
tween distant states, tax differentials appear to exercise little
plant location influence ... As between neighboring states, there
appears to be no clear relationship between industrial growth
trends and tax differentials."5 In other words, legislators may
have an exaggerated fear-not discouraged by corporate officers-
of taxing industry out of their jurisdiction. (The sad irony is
that the quality of local services, especially the schools, can weigh
heavily in location decisions. By starving themselves to grant
tax breaks to some businesses, localities may be making themselves
unattractive to others.) The ACIR did find that tax rates can
become important when a company is choosing between locations
within a state, and especially within a metropolitan region. Larger
taxing jurisdictions, or better still, uniform treatment of all
industries within a state, could remedy the problem at this level,
and disarm corporate officials of the cudgel they now wield
against local governments.
To stop corporate tax-shelter hunting, and corporate strong-
arming of tax policy and administration, ultimately there must be
action at the state, regional, and even the federal levels. But
local governments, even the smallest, do not have to wait before
daring to hold large corporate enterprises to the tax laws. Little
Anmoore, West Virginia (pop. 1050) recently demonstrated this
by calling the bluff of mighty Union Carbide (sales in 1969,
2,933 million dollars) and winning. Anmoore officials had long
paid obeisance to the Carbide installation there-which, as one
4 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, The Impact of
New Industry on Local Finances in Five Small Towns in Kentucky, (Agricultural
Economic Report #191, September, 1970) p. iv.
5 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Taxation
and Industrial Location (#A-30, April, 1967) p. 70.
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writer put it, "consumes a third of the town's total acres and all
of its air." Carbide was assessed at only 30% of fair market value,
as compared to 50% for everyone else, and until last year it had
not even been subjected to an optional building and occupancy
tax. (Last Year Amnoore levied only a small fraction of the tax).
Last December, however, the fealty ended. Behind the leadership
of Mayor Buck Gladden, a three-dollar-an-hour laborer, the city
council imposed the business and occupancy tax in full. Anmoore
will realize about 100,000 dollars annually in additional revenues,
and it will be able to build sewers, and provide playgrounds for
its young, for the first time.
As much as reform of the property tax is needed, reform of it
alone may not be enough. To achieve tax equity, substantive
changes in tax policy may be necessary; enactment of a severance
tax, and more adequate taxation of business and corporate income,
are two very likely possibilities. But what the history of the
property tax can teach us, and what needs to be faced before
tax equity of any sort can be achieved, is that powerful economic
interests will try to undermine or distort whatever reforms are
proposed. And no matter how equitable a system of taxation may
seem on paper, it will become still another vehicle of injustice, a
tool of the powerful, if it is not administered competently and
with strength, and if an informed and alert citizenry does not
ceaselessly watch at the gates.
The question is no longer what needs to be done. The question
is now who will do it. The readers of these articles are in a unique
position to lead. While the spirit of reform must run broadly
throughout the people, the lawyer's tools will be the decisive
ones in the legislatures and in the courts. Regretably, the bar
will find little inspiration for such efforts in its own past. Com-
fortable retainers have too often made lawyers the docile agents
of abuse. But as much as our culture worships comfort, the bar
at least professes to value justice more. It is time for lawyers to
practice what is professed and represent the unrepresented
interests in the property tax arena.
